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Boulevard to broken dreams, Part 2:  
Implementation of the Polonoroeste road project  
in the Brazilian Amazon, and the world Bank’s 
response to the gathering storm 
A implementação do projeto de Estrada Polonoroeste  
na Amazônia brasileira, e a resposta  
do Banco Mundial à avaliação negativa
roBerT h. wAde*
ReSuMO: esta é a segunda parte do ensaio sobre as circunstâncias que levaram o Banco 
Mundial a adotar normas e políticas operacionais para a proteção ambiental e dos povos 
indígenas no final de 1980, tal como foi traçado pela turbulenta história do projeto 
rodoviário Polonoroeste na Amazônia brasileira. Polonoroeste se tornou a ponta de 
lança onde as ONGs ambientais fizeram seu primeiro ataque ao banco por participar da 
destruição, em grande escala, ambiental e dos povos indígenas. 
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ABSTRAcT: This is the second part of the essay on the circumstances that led the World 
Bank to embrace norms and operational policies for environmental and indigenous people’s 
protection in the late 1980s, as traced through the turbulent history of the Polonoroeste 
road project in the Brazilian Amazon. Polonoroeste became the spearhead with which 
environmental NGOs made their first attack on the Bank for participating in large-scale 
environmental and indigenous peoples’ destruction. 
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This is the second part of the essay on the circumstances that led the World 
Bank to embrace norms and operational policies for environmental and indige-
nous people’s protection in the late 1980s, as traced through the turbulent his-
tory of the Polonoroeste road project in the Brazilian Amazon. Polonoroeste be-
came the spearhead with which environmental NGOs made their first attack on 
the Bank for participating in large-scale environmental and indigenous peoples’ 
destruction. 
Part 1, published in issue 36 (1), traced the history from the Bank’s first mis-
sion up to the Board of executive Directors’ approval of the project in 1981. It 
finished with an account of how the Board of executive Directors came to approve 
the first phase of the project. The regional project staff ensured that the Board was 
not presented with most of the warnings from the Bank’s central technical experts. 
Those executive Directors who had learned of the warnings more informally kept 
silent at the Board meeting because the executive Director for Brazil supported 
the project. Part 2 describes what happened on the ground as the project began to 
be implemented; and what happened inside the Bank as some of the central experts 
reached outside the Bank secretly to recruit NGOs to apply pressure from the 
outside, both directly and indirectly through the uS executive and congress (which 
had to approve uS financial contributions to the Bank). In this respect, too, Polo-
noroeste was a milestone, because reaching out for external allies had not hap-
pened before. The Bank’s later establishment of a serious environmental and in-
digenous peoples’ capacity owed a lot to the Polonoroeste campaign. 
What happened in Polonoroeste is not just of historical interest. The results 
on the ground prefigured the results of later road projects into the Amazon; and 
prefigure likely results of today’s Avança Brazil program to build multiple high-
ways, dams, power lines and other infrastructure throughout the Amazon, includ-
ing close to nature reserves and rare ecosystems. 
The first part of this essay on the Polonoroeste project, published in issue 36 
(1), traced the history from the Bank’s first reconnaissance mission up to the Board 
of executive Directors’ approval of the project in 1981. It showed how the project 
became controversial within the Bank long before it came to the attention of out-
side critics (which runs contrary to general belief that it became controversial 
because of external NGO pressure). The fight was mainly between, on the one 
hand, the project staff in the Latin American vice presidency, who saw themselves 
as innovating a whole new and sustainable approach to development in rainforest 
areas and who also had a distinct career incentive to get the loans approved, and 
on the other, technical experts in the central, advisory part of the Bank, who 
thought that the project plans had little chance of being implemented and who 
had no such career incentives vested in approval of particular projects. The techni-
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cal experts saw themselves as having to relate to the regional projects staff some-
times as diplomats and sometimes as guerrillas as they tried to ensure good project 
quality. 
Part 1 finished with an account of why the Board of executive Directors ap-
proved the first phase of the project. The regional project staff ensured that the 
Board was not presented with most of the warnings from the central experts. 
Those executive Directors who had learned of the warnings more informally kept 
silent at the Board meeting because the executive Director for Brazil supported 
the project. 
Part 2 describes what happened on the ground as the project began to be 
implemented; and what happened inside the Bank as some of the central technical 
experts reached outside the Bank secretly to enlist NGOs to bring external pres-
sure, both directly and indirectly through the uS executive and congress (which 
had to approve uS financial contributions to the Bank). In this respect, too, Polo-
noroeste was a milestone, for reaching out for external allies had not happened 
before. The Bank’s later establishment of a serious environmental and indigenous 
peoples’ capacity owed a lot to the Polonoroeste campaign. 
What happened in Polonoroeste is not just of historical interest. The results 
on the ground – notwithstanding all the Bank’s fine plans for safeguards – prefig-
ured the results of later road projects into the Amazon; and they prefigure likely 
results of today’s Avança Brazil program to build multiple highways, dams, pow-
er lines and other infrastructure throughout the Amazon, including close to nature 
reserves and rare ecosystems. 
PeRFORMANce ON THe GROuND 
The project champions justified the project, before it began to be implement-
ed, in terms of the disorders it would help to avoid. Ironically, their picture of what 
it would help to avoid turned out to be reasonably accurate descriptions of what 
did happen as the result of its partial implementation. The road works raced ahead, 
the paving being completed within three years. everything else lagged far behind 
and was often contentious. With the bulk of the funds disbursed for the road the 
Bank then had relatively little leverage left for getting the other things done. (The 
Amerindian component was financed entirely by Brazil, at the Brazilians’ insis-
tence.)
The highway and the Bank’s endorsement of the whole project contributed to 
a flood of migrants. A “golden west” fever took hold. Population in the project-
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affected area surged from an estimated 620,000 in 1982 to 1.6 million in 1988.1 
The assumptions on which the Polonoroeste development strategy had been based 
turned out to be wildly inaccurate, and the performance indicators veered far from 
their expected path. Remarkably, the Bank had not make estimates of the effects 
of the highway on migration, nor had it worked out alternative scenarios based 
on different migration assumptions.
The concerned government agencies proved largely unable or unwilling to 
implement what the government had agreed with the Bank they would do. Neither 
the territorial government nor the federal government did much to finalize the 
legal processes delimiting and enforcing the boundaries of the Amerindian and 
ecological reserves, or to limit the logging, or to provide the credit and the agri-
cultural extension necessary to make the settlements viable. Deforestation and 
spontaneous settlements occurred outside the demarcated areas, helped by the 
feeder roads. “In Rondonia there is not even a parody of forest management”, 
reported a forester consultant to the Bank in 1985.2 The newly created state of 
Rondônia created a military forest battalion, which for a long time lacked most 
of what they needed to do their job – from boots, to arms, ammunition and 
transport. 
The forestry agency was not even able to count the logs coming out, let alone 
check the logging. Logging trucks came to be known as “ants” in testimony to 
their numbers and incessant activity. The Amerindian protection agency proved 
not only ineffectual but even contemptuous of Amerindians at its top levels. In the 
sites of new colonization settlements the land agency got the sequence of soil 
surveys and settlement exactly wrong: first it settled the people, then it began to 
do (limited) soil surveys. 
Brazil’s fiscal crisis and over 100 percent inflation wrought havoc with imple-
mentation planning. The fiscal crisis meant that government agencies did not re-
ceive their operating budgets until half way through the year, which meant in the 
Amazon not until the start of the rainy season. But much of the project work had 
to be done in the dry season, and so was delayed until the rains passed. By then 
the budget allocation had lost much of its purchasing power. 
The problem was especially serious in the health component: virtually no-
where in the whole vast project area did the three necessary ingredients all exist 
1 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 59.
2 Marc Dourojeanni, “An example of the complexity of the development in the humid tropics: The 
Northwest Region Development Program in Brazil”, 1985, cited in Graham Searle, Major World Bank 
Projects: Their Impact on People, Society and the Environment (camelford, cornwall: Wadebridge 
ecological centre, 1987), p. 99.
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together: a health clinic; a trained and reliably salaried person; and essential 
supplies. Political bosses used their control of one or other of the ingredients to 
win political support. Malaria raged like a monster out of control. Many thou-
sands died. 
On one of her visits a member of the Bank’s project team, Maritta Koch-
Weser, asked to see a health center shown in the project accounts to have been 
finished. She was taken to the spot and shown… a rotting pile of timber. Project 
officials explained that by the time they received authorization to spend the bud-
geted funds the money had been substantially devalued by inflation, and then the 
rainy season began; by the next dry season the money would pay for no more than 
the wood. This is what Koch-Weser referred to as the “one legged cow” problem; 
the budgeted amounts, given these financial conditions, would suffice only for 
making the equivalent of one legged cows.
There were unanticipated legal problems too (the project missions had not 
included a legal expert). Several of the ecological and Amerindian reserves, once 
demarcated, had uncertain legal validity, because there were counterclaims to the 
same land and Brazilian law had no way to reconcile the competing claims. 
The highway and feeder roads opened the area not only to the intended ben-
eficiaries, small farmers, but also to (often highly capitalized and armed) loggers, 
miners, and cattle ranchers, who received large state subsidies, while the small 
farmers got none. The loggers, miners and ranchers had been more or less ignored 
in the planning, for the program was seen as one for “small farmers”, even though 
it was also billed as an integrated regional development program. The activities of 
these extractors formed a flourishing extractive economy.3 
The combination of poor soils, lack of farming skills, and lack of farm ser-
vices induced many small farmer “project beneficiaries” to join the extractive 
(logging, mining, ranching) economy. Not till 1986 did FAO experts do the calcu-
lations that explained what had been happening on the ground: they showed that 
a settler who cleared a plot of jungle and worked it for the three years necessary 
to claim possession could get much higher returns by selling the property to a 
(subsidized) speculator and then moving on to clear another plot than by opting 
for sustained cultivation. Also, poor farmers, once settled, quickly repeated the 
only pattern they knew from latifundio in other parts of the country – they em-
3 cattle ranching can be included as extractive because the conversion of tropical rainforest to pasture 
“rates the worst, environmentally, of all conceivable alternatives”. Robert Goodland, “environmental 
ranking of Amazonian development projects in Brazil”, Environmental Conservation, vol. 7, n. 1, spring, 
1980, pp. 18-19.
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ployed landless share croppers to work their newly titled land, creating a new 
underclass even poorer than themselves. 
underlying many implementation problems was the “carpet bagging” nature 
of frontier society (in the North American metaphor), with predatory elites able 
to suborn the local offices of government agencies.4 Almost everyone who bene-
fited from the extractive economy in the region was opposed to the ecological and 
Amerindian components; and by the implementation stage of Polonoroeste, the 
extractive economy began to swamp the agricultural economy under the impact 
of new mining discoveries. even had there been more political support, it would 
still have been difficult to strengthen implementing capacity on the ground given 
the fiscal crisis and high inflation, and given, most importantly, the flood of mi-
grants that the highway upgrading helped to bring. 
In retrospect the outcome could hardly have been different, for all the innova-
tive plans that were made about where the forest and Amerindian reserves should 
go and about what sort of crop patterns the new settlers should practice. It was 
not just that the Bank and Brazil had little data on such fundamentals as soils, as 
the specialists in the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development Department kept 
saying. It was, more basically, that the Bank hardly engaged with the question of 
the ability and willingness of the government agencies on the ground to do what 
the plans required them to do.
FeeDBAcK AND ReSPONSe
everyone in the Bank recognized that the project would have to be carefully 
supervised. During loan negotiations the Bank insisted that a non-governmental 
Brazilian agency be given the task of evaluating information about progress on the 
ground, a step the Brazilian side resisted. eventually, under Bank pressure, it ap-
pointed a little known university-based consulting group with no environmental 
expertise. When the Bank pressed for environmental expertise the consulting group 
linked up with a marine and oceanographic institute. When the Bank pressed again 
a year went by before the consulting group found an organization with green 
expertise. A Bank report, examining the Bank’s world-wide monitoring and eval-
uation efforts, commented about Polonoroeste, “project management [on the Bra-
zilian side] at times tried all its tools – vetoing access to information, claiming that 
evaluations were not carried out to the letter of the contract or competently, or 
4 Margaret Keck, “Planafloro in Rondonia, Brazil: the limits of leverage”, in Jonathan Fox and David 
Brown (eds.), The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements, 
Boston: MIT Press, 1998.
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not releasing travel funds or salaries [...] to make sure the process was as difficult 
as possible”.5
The Bank, too, was slow to acknowledge, accept and act upon the information 
in internal reports and those of the external evaluating agency.6 In the whole of 
1984, for example, there was only one supervision mission, involving 13 staff 
weeks.7 No Bank staff were stationed near the region. Hardly surprising that the 
Brazilians concluded that the Bank was not entirely committed to the non-road 
building objectives of the project.
Nevertheless, the growing imbalance between the road work and the rest of 
the project became well-known to the project staff. yet notwithstanding the Brazil-
ians’ failure to meet core conditions and in disregard of the terms of the loan 
agreement, the Board approved the phase III loan for Polonoroeste in October 
1983 for the purpose of creating new agricultural settlements.8 In their presenta-
tion of the phase III project to the Board the Latin America region’s staff made no 
reference to the difficulties being encountered on the ground. The staff said, “This 
project built upon and extended to new settlement areas the strategy of develop-
ment used in the prior phases, which were being implemented in line with fore-
casts”. They assured the Board that the projects had been designed to provide 
services and credit to small farmers, but did not say what they already knew, that 
credit and services were not arriving and that farmers were indeed selling out and 
moving closer to the frontier or into the cities and towns. 
On the special project for the protection of Amerindian communities the staff 
said, “The Bank had monitored the progress of this special project closely and 
would continue to do so”– without saying what the results of its “close monitoring” 
had revealed, other than, “the Bank would not have gone ahead with any project 
in the region if it had not been convinced that the Government was implementing 
the Amerindian component to its fullest capacity”. All this was designed to mislead 
by enough to get Board approval for the final phase. 
By this time, two years after they had approved phase I, some executive Direc-
tors were beginning to worry about Polonoroeste. To each of their concerns the 
5 World Bank, “An Overview of Monitoring and evaluation in the World Bank”, Operations evaluation 
Department Report No. 13247, June 30, 1994, p. 31. 
6 See World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 94.
7 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 94. However, members 
of the core team say that they piggy-backed supervision work on top of project preparation work for 
later projects in the three phase package, so that actual supervision was more than the “supervision” 
figures show. 
8 Phase II had been for the extension of phase I into the next-door state of Mato Grosso. 
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staff gave reassuring replies that concealed much contrary information.9 The staff 
misled not only the Board but also the president. In a briefing paper on Polonoro-
este to President clausen in December 1983,10 the staff wrote, “The Bank main-
tains the right to supervise the Special Project [for Amerindian protection] and no 
obstacles in this respect have been encountered. Bank staff contact with FuNAI is 
easy [...] Implementation of the Special Project is now satisfactory [...] We have, 
and will continue to monitor the Special Project closely given its sensitivity and 
visibility in the international scene.” 
This is another example of an outright lie, designed to keep the disbursement 
of the loan on track (the key criterion of success for the project staff and their 
managers). The internal files show that at this time the division chief was telling 
the Brazilian government that implementation was very unsatisfactory.11 Few of 
the 37 Indian reserves had been completely demarcated and registered, and at least 
15 had recently been invaded by squatters, loggers, and others. In other words, the 
staff’s internal reports after field visits and what they reported up the line to senior 
management differed substantially. Those with managerial responsibility for the 
project portrayed things in the best light, not least because senior managers let it 
be known they did not want to hear bad news. 
SuSPeNSION OF DISBuRSeMeNTS
After the slow start in establishing a competent “independent” evaluation 
agency, evaluation teams belonging to “Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas econômi-
cas (FIPe) of the university of São Paulo brought together experts in malaria, 
indigenous peoples and rural development, and spent some six weeks every year 
in the field collecting data. By their second year they produced damning results 
based on thorough ground-level knowledge. They fed these results to the project 
staff at the Bank, reinforcing a growing conviction that only suspension of dis-
bursements might produce a stronger commitment on the part of the agencies in 
the project area. 
The mid-term review mission, of nine members (led by a person not previ-
ously involved in the project team), went out in November 1984 and presented its 
9 Minutes of meeting of the executive Directors, October 25, 1983, dated December 15, 1983.
10 Briefing paper to A.W. clausen from Suitbertus van der Meer (acting regional VP) through ernest 
Stern, “Brazil- Northwest Region Integrated Development Program-- Briefing on Amerindians”, dated 
Dec 28, 1983, emphasis added.
11 For example, telegram from Hendrick van der Heijden to Minister Mario Andreazza, Ministry of 
Interior, dated 17 March 1983. van der Heijden replaced Skillings as division chief for Brazil Programs.
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report in late February 1985. By now, Skillings was gone, several new people had 
joined the team, lots of accurate feedback was on hand. In these new circum-
stances the mission’s report was able to document the many failings.12 It said that 
the whole program’s “mitigating” measures had been “stunted by weak program 
coordination, institutional inefficiencies and an undisguised lack of political sup-
port for environmental and Amerindian protection”. 
The whole Northwest program had arrived at a critical juncture, the mid-term 
review concluded. If the program were “to stem [the] adverse and growing trend 
towards transgressions into reserve lands and failures in small-farmer colonization” 
it needed to be strengthened with “far more effective coordination and implemen-
tation instruments”. It laid out an action plan to which the Brazilians would have 
to commit themselves in order for disbursements to be resumed. It concluded, “The 
above proposals [...] are made with the firm belief that past Bank involvement in 
the Northwest program has, overall, helped to prevent even worse outcomes, and 
that, however unrewarding and thankless the defense of the small farmers, Indians 
and environment of the region may be, the Bank should do its utmost to help 
overcome the present difficulties and remain involved in the orderly development 
of the Amazon”.13 
Soon after the mid term review was presented, in March 1985, the senior 
regional managers decided to suspend disbursements until such time as a “correc-
tive Action Program” could be agreed on and specific measures taken for Amerin-
dian protection. Suspension of disbursements was a rare event. In this case it owed 
much to the fact that by the start of 1985 a completely new line of command on 
Polonoroeste was in place, comprising people who had no special interest in the 
project because not involved in its initiation. It included a new project officer 
(Maritta Koch-Weser), who had been responsible for “social” aspects of the proj-
ect since 1981 and who was now given responsibility for the whole. (Recall that 
until this time no one had responsibility for substantive integration of all the 
components, with the partial exception of Skillings in the early years.) The new 
line of command also included a new deputy division chief and new division chief 
for Brazil Projects; a new division chief for Brazil Programs, who considered Po-
lonoroeste an embarrassing nuisance he did not wish to deal with; and a new vice 
president for Latin America. 
With this change of personnel Maritta Koch-Weser, who had long concluded 
12 Mid-term review, internal memorandum of February 25, 1985. 
13 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 75.
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that only suspension might get the Brazilians to take their commitments seriously, 
was able to act. 
Then came two changes in the larger context. First, the NGO campaign 
against what was billed as the Polonoroeste “debacle” began, as a few Bank staff 
linked up with NGOs like the environmental Defense Fund and supplied them 
with information. (They smuggled one of the NGO leaders past the Bank’s secu-
rity guards night after night to trawl through documents.) The NGOs called for 
suspension of disbursements, and powerful figures in the uS congress called for 
the uS to cut its contributions to the Bank. Second, Brazil’s first civilian govern-
ment in twenty years had just taken office, and could accept a suspension as indict-
ing its military predecessors rather than itself.
Five months later, in August 1985, when the Brazilian government presented 
to the Bank an action plan to deal with the problems and showed evidence that 
the settlers had been removed from a recently invaded Indian reserve, the Bank 
resumed disbursements.
AFTeR 1985
Maritta Koch-Weser, project officer from early 1985, was moved off Polo-
noroeste after two years in 1987 on the arrival of a new director of the Brazil 
Department.14 The new director couldn’t understand all the fuss about Indian 
protection, he said. “They wear T shirts and sneakers just like everyone else”. He 
openly disparaged her work on Amerindian protection. “It’s bullshit”, they heard 
him say. He appointed a new project officer, one of whose first moves was to agree 
to the Brazilian government’s request to terminate the contract with the universi-
ty-based monitoring and evaluation unit.15 The new project officer found it incon-
venient to have such a unit connected to the project, now that it had finally begun 
to produce some critical reports. In any case, he was a general economist more 
interested in agricultural production than in social and environmental issues; and 
as son of a uruguayan cattle rancher he did not hide his belief that absorption of 
Indians into the national culture, and cattle ranching in place of rainforest, were 
both signs of progress which the Bank should encourage. 
Suspension did have an effect. In the period from 1985 to the formal end of 
the Polonoroeste project in 1989, the Brazilian government somewhat strength-
ened the implementing capacities of the state agencies, demarcated most of the 
14 Armiene choksi.
15 Luis coirolo.
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reserves, and provided some of the infrastructure of the settlement projects (the 
health centers, water supply systems, schools, storage facilities). Gradually the 
government on the ground began to make some progress in doing some of the 
things it had agreed to do years before. 
yet the study by the Bank’s Operations evaluation Department found that 
“despite the government’s formal compliance with most of the recommendations 
made by the Bank at the time of the mid-term review [late 1984/early 1985], in 
general the situation in September-October 1989 was not very different from that 
encountered in late 1984. Polonoroeste appears to have been largely unable to 
implement and/or sustain many of its environmental protection measures or to 
avoid the continual invasion of reserve areas by loggers, prospectors, and sponta-
neous settlers”.16 The project organization on the ground could not even maintain 
the toilets in the headquarters’ building –”the filthiest toilets I’d ever seen in my 
life”, said one much-traveled FAO agricultural expert who visited in 1986. 
In the words of an FAO agricultural expert, “We failed to grasp the nettle of 
institutional problems, we failed to recognize that we were dealing with a lot of 
rascals. All segments of Polonoroeste planning gave insufficient weight to the hid-
den agendas of almost everyone with whom we were dealing. They were almost 
universally motivated by what they could make in the short term in a turbulent 
situation. Then we grossly over-estimated the capacity of Bank leverage to alter 
this.” 17
Skillings himself rested his decision to go ahead on the conviction that the 
governor of Rondônia “had his heart in the right place” – that he was genuinely 
concerned to alleviate the poverty of the settlers, as indicated by his commitment 
to upgrade slums during his tenure as mayor of a regional city.18 confidence in the 
commitment of the governor translated – quite wrongly – into confidence in the 
ability of the government apparatus to deliver its commitments. The division of 
labor between the Bank and FAO did not help; the FAO experts thought it was 
the Bank’s responsibility to worry about the institutional problems, while the Bank 
was happy to assume that FAO had taken care of the problem of securing the 
agreement of government agencies to provide the requisite package of agricul-
tural support.
16 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 108. For more on the 
wider political context of Amazonian destruction, see Andrew Hurrell, “Brazil and the international 
politics of Amazonian destruction”, in The International Politics of the Environment, A. Hurrell and B. 
Kingsbury (eds.), Oxford: clarendon Press, 1992.
17 Simon Hocombe, personal communication, 20 June 1997.
18 Robert Skillings, interview with author, 24 June 1996.
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In short, the Bank’s desire to lend to Brazil and at the same time show the 
world how to do rainforest settlement, coupled with its general avoidance of po-
litical or administrative analysis, led the relevant people to assumptions about 
Polonoroeste that the new Latin American vice president described, looking back, 
as “almost deliberately naive”.19 In particular, they simply assumed that the Brazil-
ians would respond to Bank pressure, and that agreements reached at the apex of 
national agencies in Brasilia could be carried out against the wishes of elites in the 
far periphery. They also assumed that the senior managers of the Bank had more 
than a passing interest in the substance of the project, as distinct from moving 
money out the door. 
Throughout, the clinching legitimation for Bank involvement was that without 
the Bank the project would have gone ahead anyway, with much worse results. 
This in turn hinged on the assumption that the Brazilian government would have 
financed the road on its own, and that the road would have been paved at about 
the same speed. The Bank never examined this assumption. The OeD study is 
emphatic that the Brazilian government would not have been able to pave the road 
at anything like the same speed without the Bank. It cites the federal government’s 
fiscal crisis in the late 1970s, and the sheer insistence with which the government 
pressed the Bank for financial help with the road.20 Bank support not only speed-
ed up road paving, it also gave the government legitimacy for the whole operation. 
This in turn boosted the coalition of people who supported the rapid opening of 
the Northwest, especially the loggers, miners and ranchers, while eclipsing the 
nebulous opposition to the project within Brazil. “To the eyes of the outside world 
[...] the financial and technical backing provided by the Bank was generally inter-
preted as full, institutional subscription to the objectives, basic approach and tim-
ing of the program [...] party to a series of actions or inactions by the territorial, 
19 David Knox, who became vice president for Latin America in time for the mid-term review of 
Polonoroeste, interview, 15 May 1995.
20 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 246. There is no doubt 
the Brazilian government would have tried to press ahead on its own. The then Minister of the Interior 
and former Transport Minister aspired to be a presidential candidate. For this purpose he wished to 
sponsor pharaonic-scale works. He also needed votes from the electoral college. The electoral college 
was made up of state representatives. Rondônia at the start of the Polonoroeste program was a territory, 
not a state. Its governor was his brother-in-law, and could assure him Rondônia’s electoral college votes 
if it became a state. Also, the highway program would give the Rondônia government control over 
federal expenditures within the area, which might be diverted for purposes electoral. But the force of 
this political argument for paving the highway diminished as the Interior Minister’s presidential 
campaign floundered. 
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state and regional administrations that were to have serious adverse environmen-
tal consequences in subsequent years”.21 
The Bank failed to act to counter the fundamental asymmetry of commitment. 
From the beginning, the Brazilian government was much more interested in getting 
the highway and feeder roads built than in doing the other things that the Bank 
called for at the same time. The Bank could have conditioned disbursements for 
the roadworks on progress with the other components. It did not. 
POLONOROeSTe’S PReDeceSSOR:  
INDONeSIAN TRANSMIGRATION PROJecT
Two of the striking features of Polonoroeste are, first, the way that the cau-
tious assessments of the technical experts in the central, advisory part of the Bank 
were set aside by regional project staff and regional senior management incentiv-
ized by “loan disbursement” as the main metric of career success; second, the use 
of “the government will do the project anyway, and will do it worse than if the 
Bank is involved” to justify Bank participation. These features are also evident in 
the history of a slightly earlier Bank-funded rainforest settlement project, in Indo-
nesia. It is worth taking a quick look to see the similarities. 
The Transmigration project, perhaps the most ambitious resettlement scheme 
in the non-communist world, moved millions of people from Indonesia’s crowded 
inner islands to the thinly populated outer islands. Started on a small-scale in 1950, 
by the late 1960s it became the top priority project for the Indonesian government. 
In 1969 Indonesia annexed the western half of New Guinea against local resistance. 
The government wished to populate the territory with inhabitants from the inner 
islands so as to bring it reliably under the government’s control; and it redoubled 
its efforts to do the same in the other outer islands, afraid that the chinese com-
munists might exploit the presence of overseas chinese in the outer islands to set 
up communist bases, in line with the domino theory. At this time Indonesia, under 
new leader General Suharto, moved strongly into the western camp, and western 
states, especially the uS, wished to support “our man”. 
Bank involvement, championed by President Robert McNamara (a believer 
in the domino theory of communist expansion), started in 1975, several years 
before Polonoroeste. Between 1976 and 1986 the Bank lent about $1 billion. The 
Bank’s money attracted more millions of dollars from other bilateral and multi-
lateral financial agencies; and helped to produce an exponential rise in the rate of 
21 World Bank, “World Bank Approaches to the environment in Brazil”, vol. V, p. 247.
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settlement. In the 15 years after 1976 3.5 million people were officially resettled, 
and roughly the same number migrated on their own.
The results were disastrous. A French survey in the late 1980s found that 80 
percent of Transmigration sites had failed to improve the living standard of their 
inhabitants over what it had been before the migration.22 A study in 1985 by 
ministries of the Indonesian government in collaboration with the London-based 
International Institute for environment and Development found that the collapse 
of existing resettlement sites was so common as to pose a problem for national 
security, as the cities and towns filled with refugees. 23
From the beginning almost all of the Bank’s technical staff – those in the 
relevant operating division as well as those in the central Projects Staff and in the 
World Bank-FAO cooperative Program – had serious doubts. They worried espe-
cially about the capacity of the soils of the outer islands to support intensive settle-
ment. Why had people not migrated long ago from dense Java to the outer islands, 
if not that the soils of the outer islands were too poor to provide them with alter-
natives? 
Many of the technical staff, though, thought that the FeLDA (Malaysia) mod-
el of jungle settlement might work. The FeLDA model was based on new planting 
of rubber as a cash crop, together with small plots of mixed fruit and field crops 
that were intended for subsistence pending maturity of the rubber. It was, how-
ever, very expensive.
Then the Bank’s project managers learned that McNamara himself had agreed 
with President Suharto on massive support for a low cost per family program, a 
cost much lower than the FeLDA model, so low as to rule out the planned invest-
ment in rubber, leaving annual field crops as the only alternative. The technical 
staff said this was impossible; field crops would not generate anywhere near 
enough income. But the Bank’s (technically unqualified) line management seized 
on the results of a small-scale study of field crops in an experimental station, and 
insisted that these results provided the yield levels to be assumed in the farm 
model underlying the appraisal report, a blatant falsification. 
The central technical personnel protested at this illegitimate extrapolation 
from carefully controlled experimental station conditions to new farms in felled 
rainforest, to no avail. One of them later related, “All of us who had a good prac-
22 carolyn Marr, “uprooting people, destroying cultures: Indonesia’s Transmigration program”, 
Multinational Monitor, October 1990, pp. 12-15. 
23 Government of Indonesia, Department of Forestry, State Ministry of Population, environment and 
Development, Department of the Interior, and International Institute for environment and Development, 
“A review of policies affecting sustainable development of forest lands in Indonesia”, vol. 2, November, 
1985, p. 117; and Rich, Mortgaging the Earth, pp. 34-38.
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tical knowledge of humid tropical agriculture had no confidence that the high 
yields obtained under carefully controlled, well managed, experimental station 
conditions could be replicated under transmigration conditions. Because of my 
opposition I was thenceforth excluded from the appraisal report, negotiation and 
Board presentation. Obviously I was aggrieved that my counsel was being rejected, 
but given the way things were going I was happy to be cleared of any responsibil-
ity for a project in which I had little faith. So much for solidly based technical 
judgments when pressure to lend becomes so important! I firmly believe that the 
responsibility for sticking so tenaciously with the low cost model could be traced 
right up to the office of the President [McNamara]. All lower levels of management 
were unwilling to stand up and be counted. I felt especially sorry for the members 
of the appraisal team who eventually had to carry this project to the Board. I think 
it is more than coincidence that [...] the mission leader went down with a heart 
attack, which I believe was stress related, due to his own reservations about the 
project and the difficult position in which he found himself [...]A few years after 
the project went to the Board I happened to meet up with the agronomist who had 
carried out the field cropping experiments, and when I told him of how his data 
had been interpreted by the Bank he expressed surprise and incredulity. As for 
myself, my disgust at the turn of events was such that I decided I wanted out, and 
I applied for a position at the regional mission in Thailand”. 24 
The Transmigration project shows the overwhelming importance of geopo-
litical considerations in some Bank projects. Once McNamara had made his com-
mitment known (unrelated to technical and economic assessment) the whole line 
management – the division chiefs and departmental directors in both the project 
and program hierarchies – worked to justify the project on technical and eco-
nomic grounds over the strong objections of technical experts. McNamara de-
manded a cost/benefit justification for everything. So the line management pro-
vided him with fraudulent data, derived by illegitimately extrapolating yields on 
experimental station plots to new jungle farms. 
They also developed the argument, “The Indonesians are doing it anyway, they 
are doing it badly, therefore the Bank should get involved”.25 Such an argument 
had not previously been used to justify a Bank project. Its use in the Transmigra-
tion case marked a turning point in the organization’s history. Once accepted for 
Transmigration it entered the standard repertoire of justifications, as seen in Po-
24 Bill Panton, personal communication, 4 March 1996.
25 The director of the Indonesia programs department, Shahid Husain, championed this argument. He 
was rapidly promoted, and spent twenty years moving around the senior-most management positions 
in the Bank. 
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lonoroeste; especially because it could be used to weaken any technical justification 
for not lending to a project that Bank management wanted in the portfolio for 
geopolitical or lending target reasons. With technical discipline weakened in prac-
tice (though not in appearance), the Bank plunged into a number of projects that 
the NGOs could later present as debacles.
Did the Polonoroeste project team study the experience of Transmigration? 
“We had only a vague knowledge of Transmigration”, said one of the key people. 
“No-one ever said, ‘We should look at Transmigration’”.26 Learning from other 
parts of the world was not normal practice in the Bank at this time, despite the 
existence of the big central pool of project experts. 
cONcLuSION
The Polonoroeste story shows the “street-level” politics behind Susan Park 
and Antje Vetterlein’s generalization: “change is slow in international bureaucra-
cies such as the IMF and the World Bank because they have organizational cultures 
or identities through which new norms must penetrate. change is [...] costly since 
habits and traditions must be adapted or reinvented [...] Different levels of resis-
tance can be expected according to the organizations’ mandate and professional 
background of staff in relation to different policy fields”.27
In the Polonoroeste case the main impetus for new norms came from the 
project leaders themselves, based in the regional programs hierarchy and the re-
gional projects hierarchy, who conceived of the project as the test bed for a new 
way to do development in rainforests in line with norms of ecological sustainabil-
ity and indigenous people’s protection. The cross-country experts in the central 
hierarchy championed the same new norms, but argued that the project on the 
ground, given ecological conditions plus the Brazilian government’s lack of capac-
ity, would be unable to deliver the normative objectives. 
In Polonoroeste, as also in Indonesia’s Transmigration project and many oth-
ers, the balance of power lay with the operational staff; they could avoid the 
checks and balances built into the structure without too much difficulty when 
they had the incentive and when senior management supported them. Since both 
operational staff and senior managers operated in an incentive structure where 
their task performance and promotion were judged by their ability to obtain 
Board approval and disburse the loans, both staff and senior managers often did 
26 Denis Mahar, interview, 8 May 1998.
27 Park and Vetterlein, op. cit., 233.
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have an incentive to avoid the checks and balances. The executive Directors were 
sometimes only too keen to have the wool pulled over their eyes. Only at the third 
stage of the Polonoroeste project, by which time evidence lay all around that the 
first two stages were not working, did some members of the Board express wor-
ries; but they were readily reassured by dissembling staff. Not till the mid-term 
review – when a big NGO campaign against Polonoroeste was underway, and 
when a new set of Bank staff had taken over the project – did the Board agree to 
the very unusual step of suspending disbursements until the Brazilian government 
had made good on (some of) its commitments about ecological and Amerindian 
protection. 
We do not know how many projects were modified, delayed, or cancelled 
because of internal opposition, and how many sailed through with internal op-
position overridden by target-seeking project officers. But we can be sure that the 
behavior of project managers and the Board in Polonoroeste was not exceptional. 
This underlines the important role of external monitors – the environmental ad-
vocacy NGOs – which in the mid 1980s began to use their leverage with congress 
to force the Bank to become more transparent and accountable. 
On the other hand, this story also shows that a distinction between project 
champions inside the Bank and project critics outside the Bank is too simple. The 
effectiveness of external monitoring, at least in the first years of the normative 
shift, depended heavily on insiders covertly helping external actors to pressure 
senior management and their own colleagues. 
Partly in response to the Polonoroeste campaign President Barber conable 
included the creation of a large environmental complex in the Bank as part of a 
root-and-branch reorganization in 1986-87. (When James Baker was appointed 
Treasury Secretary in the second Reagan administration he hatched the plan to 
protect the uS banking system from the risk of a Latin American debt default or 
restructuring by getting the World Bank to lend heavily to Latin American govern-
ments, which would use the money to repay their debts to uS banks, thereby 
shifting the risks of default onto the membership of the World Bank. But the plan 
required an increase in the uS contribution to the capital base of the Bank, and 
Baker knew that congress was in no mood to agree, having been roiled up by the 
environmental NGOs. So Baker took the opportunity to appoint his friend, Barber 
conable, an ex-congressman, as the next president, and told him to undertake a 
big reorganization, including a big push on environmental capacity.) With the 
creation of a large environmental complex in the Bank, the environmental and 
indigenous people’s protection norms – which had been emerging slowly through 
the internal and external processes described here – gained Bank-wide “formal 
validity” by being translated into operational procedures (for example, procedures 
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requiring certain types of environmental assessments, certain types of consultations 
with affected peoples). ever since then the Bank has been much more wary of 
sponsoring projects in tropical rainforests, and indeed, more wary of infrastructure 
projects in general. The Bank’s (and other multilateral development banks’) pull 
back from infrastructure left a hole which, much later, china started to fill by 
leading the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
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